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We examine determinants of the composition of public expenditure in the German Laender 
(states) over the period 1992–2008, as the Laender exhibit a high degree of institutional and 
political  homogeneity  and  are  endowed  with  extensive  fiscal  competences.  Our  prime 
contribution  is  an  investigation  into  how  political  leaders’  socioeconomic  background 
influences public spending priorities. Applying sociological theory, we link preferences for 
the  composition  of  public  spending  to  social  status.  In  contrast  to  approaches  relying  on 
political budget cycles or partisan theory, we find strong and theory-consistent evidence that 
prime ministers tend to favour fiscal policies supporting the social class in which they are 
socialised.  Governments  led  by  prime  ministers  from  a  poor  socioeconomic  background 
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1. Introduction 
Starting  about  20  years  ago  with  the  seminal  work  by  Rogoff  (1990),  economists  have 
become  increasingly  interested  in  explaining  variation  in  the  composition  of  public 
expenditure.  This  strand  of  research  owes  its  importance  due  to  the  fact  that  changes  in 
government  spending  priorities  appear  to  affect  economic  growth  (e.g.,  Barro,  1990; 
Devarajan et al., 1996), social welfare (Rogoff, 1990), subjective well-being (Hessami, 2010), 
and social inequality, i.e., the distribution of valuable resources among different groups in the 
society.
1 
Most research in this field comes from political economists and a great deal of this involves 
applications of political budget cycle (PBC) theory. PBC scholars suggest that changes in the 
apportionment of the public budget are linked to the legislative cycle. Rogoff (1990) assumes 
that voters lack information about government competence in efficiently administering the 
provision  of public goods  and concludes that  increased  public spending on  highly visible 
items is employed as a signalling device prior to elections. Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2010) 
model an electorate which cannot observe the preferences of the incumbent regarding the 
composition  of  public  expenditure  and  thus  expect  a  pre-electoral  rise  in  targetable 
expenditure  categories,  i.e.,  categories  which  directly  support  certain  groups  of  voters, 
generating so-called pork-barrel cycles.
2 Typically, researchers try to find evidence for PBC 
in spending on infrastructure projects   and social security transfers , since these items  are 
commonly regarded as both highly visible and targetable.  However, the outcome of these 
studies is inconclusive;  some studies confirm the  predictions of the  theoretical  models, 
whereas others find pre-electoral decreases in spending on these items.
3 
While PBC scholars analyse budgetary changes within one legislative period, variations in the 
budget across different governments are commonly attributed to partisan ideology. There are 
only few studies investigating partisan effects on the composition of the budget and their 
results  are,  again,  mixed  (see,  e.g.,  Kittel  and  Obinger,  2003;  Veiga  and  Veiga,  2007; 
                                                           
1 Moreover, recent studies investigate the influence of public spending in certain policy fields on private sector 
performance. For instance, García-Quevedo (2004) finds in a meta-analysis that public spending on R&D tends 
to crowd-out business expenditure on R&D. Heinemann (2008) shows that an increase in welfare state spending 
negatively affects benefit morale, i.e. the reluctance to claim public benefits without legal entitlement. 
2 See Vergne (2009) for a more detailed comparison of both models and their conclusions. 
3 Regarding spending on infrastructure, Blais  and Nadeau (1992) find evidence for pre -electoral increases in 
spending on the construction of roads in Canadian provinces, Schuknecht (2000) finds the same in a sample of 
24 developing countries, as does Khemani (2004) for Indian states. Drazen and Eslav a (2005, 2010) report that 
spending on diverse infrastructure items increases prior to elections in Columbian municipalities; Veiga and 
Veiga (2007) discover comparable results for Portuguese municipalities. Contradictory results are presented by 
Block (2002), who finds a negative impact of upcoming elections on spending on infrastructure in a sample of 69 
developing countries, as does Vergne (2009) in a sample of 42 developing countries. Regarding spending on 
social security transfers, Blais and Nadeau (1992) note a significant increase in social transfer payments prior to 
elections, whereas Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2010) find a significant decrease. 4 
Potrafke, 2009). When it comes to public expenditure composition, leftist governments are 
usually  supposed  to  spend  more  on  items  supporting  the  working  class,  especially  social 
security, education, and health, than their right-wing counterparts (Galli and Rossi, 2002). 
PBC and partisan theory view politicians as either purely opportunistic or solely driven by 
partisan ideology. The approach put forward in this paper derives from arguments developed 
in sociology. Our hypothesis is that incumbents’ preferences for, and decisions about, the 
composition  of  public  expenditure  are  influenced  by  their  socioeconomic  status,  i.e.,  an 
individual’s relative standing in society. We expect that the composition of public expenditure 
exhibits a social rivalry motive: governments led by political leaders characterised by low 
family  status  tend  to  conduct  policies  supporting  a  levelling  of  status-related  social 
inequalities. This implies increasing expenditure on items such as social security, education, 
and health care, as these are prominent dimensions of social deprivation. Our novel approach 
contributes  to  a  growing  literature  linking  government  performance  to  individual 
characteristics of incumbent political leaders (e.g., Jones and Olken, 2005; Dreher et al., 2009; 
Hayo and Neumeier, 2011). 
We apply our theoretical prediction to the states of the Federal Republic of Germany—the 
Laender (Bundesländer)—and their leaders, the prime ministers (Ministerpräsidenten), for the 
period  1992–2008.  The  Laender  are  characterised  by  a  high  degree  of  institutional  and 
political homogeneity and are endowed with extensive fiscal competences. Previous research 
on the German Laender finds no evidence for either economically significant opportunistic or 
partisan cycles in public spending priorities.
4 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We next take a brief look at the fiscal 
competences of the German Laender. In  Section 3, we describe the concept  of social status 
and introduce an empirical indicator. Our research hypotheses are stated in Section 4, where 
we motivate the link between status and public spending prior ities. Section 5 outlines our 
empirical approach. The results of our empirical analysis are presented in Section 6, along 
with robustness checks in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Fiscal Competences of the German Laender 
The German federal system consists of three governmental levels: the federal, the state, and 
                                                           
4 The most comprehensive analysis so far is that of Galli and Rossi (2002), who search for opportunistic and 
partisan cycles in West German states in five different expenditure categories: public administration, education, 
health, social security, and road construction. They do find pre-electoral increases in spending on administration 
and health, but the economic effects are rather small. With respect to partisan cycles, they state that ‘the party 
variable generally does not play a systematic role in spending decisions’ (Galli and Rossi, 2002: 298). 5 
the  local.
5 The  German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) assigns   legislative power to the  state 
governments as long as no opposing constitutional rule exists  (Article 30 Grundgesetz). In 
particular,  the  German  state  governments  are  almost  exclusively  responsible  for  state 
administration, education, and public safety. However,  in some policy areas, constitutional 
articles assign certain competences to the federal and local  level as well. With respect to 
social  security,  cultural  affairs,  health  care,  public  research  and  development ,  and 
infrastructure, for example, competences of the federal, state, and local levels overlap. There 
are 16 Laender, three of which are so-called city states (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg).
6 As 
city states combine competences assigned to the state and the local level, they are not fully 
comparable to the non-city states and therefore are excluded from the subsequent analysis. 
Figure 1 illustrates the average share of total spending  in the 13 Laender on each of eight 
policy fields. These expenditure components are the most important ones and make up about 
two-thirds of the total budget.
7 
 
Figure 1: Average composition of public expenditure within the German Laender. 
 
The greatest part of the states’ budgets is devoted to education, making up, on average, more 
than 25% of total state  spending, followed by  spending on public safety  with  a share of 
approximately 10%. 
                                                           
5 A  more  detailed  overview  of  German  fiscal  federalism  is  provided  by  Seitz  (2000)  and  Jochimsen  and 
Nuscheler (2011). 
6 These are  Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpomerania,  North  Rhine  Westphalia,  Rhineland -Palatinate,  Saarland,  Schleswig -Holstein, 
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. 
7 The remaining third is mainly spent on transfers to local governments, transfers paid to other states within the 
German fiscal equalization scheme, public debt service, and a great number of other expenditure items  which 
account only for a small proportion of the public budget. A detailed breakdown of each expenditure category, as 


















All three governmental levels are run on a parliamentary system, with several different parties 
competing for political power (proportional representation). During our sample period, at the 
state  level  single-party  governments  occur  as  well  as  coalition  governments,  majority 
governments, and minority governments. Each state government is either led by the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) or the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which are located right and 
left of the political centre, respectively. 
One may wonder whether the head of government in a parliamentary system can influence 
fiscal policy. In the case of the German Laender, prime ministers affect policy choices via at 
least two channels: they (i) appoint cabinet ministers and (ii) have guideline competences 
(Richtlinienkompetenz), that is, the authority to issue directives to cabinet ministers. Thus, 
German prime ministers can ensure that all government members are backing their preferred 
policy. 
 
3. On Status, Identity, and Social Rivalry 
As outlined in the introduction, there is no clear evidence in the extant empirical literature that 
changes in public spending priorities are linked to legislative cycles or government ideology. 
In this paper, we highlight the influence of incumbent political leaders’ social status on fiscal 
policy  preferences  as  an  explanation  of  variations  in  public  expenditure  composition.  A 
growing literature in economics is concerned with the question of whether political leaders 
exert an influence on economic performance.  Recent studies reveal that factors related to 
political  leaders’  socioeconomic  background  appear  to  explain  variations  in  economic 
performance, especially when it comes to economic growth (Besley et al., 2009), changes in 
institutional frameworks (Dreher et al., 2009) and constitutions (Hayo and Voigt, 2011), as 
well as fiscal policy (Mikosch, 2009).
8 However, as argued by  Hayo and Neumeier  (2011), 
most of these studies employ variables characterising political leaders in an  ad hoc fashion, 
failing  to  provide  a  theoretical  link  between  the  socioeconomic  background  of  heads  of 
government and their government’s performance. 
Applying  sociological  and  psychological  research  suggests  that  preferences  for  the 
composition of public spending may be influenced by what is called socioeconomic status. In 
the remainder of this section, we explain (i) how status is defined and (ii) why  people’s 
preferences with respect to the composition of public expenditure are status dependent. In the 
                                                           
8 Individual  socioeconomic  characteristics  are  also  used  as  explanatory  variables  for  committee  decisions. 
Göhlmann  and  Vaubel  (2007),  for  instance,  investigate  the  impact  of  the  educational  and  occupational 
backgrounds of 391 central bankers  from 10 European countries on inflation outcomes and find significant 
effects. 7 
next section, we put forward an argument for why we expect political leaders to conduct 
policies that support the status rank from which they come. 
 
3.1 Status Definition and its Measurement 
According  to  social  stratification  theory,  societies  should  be  viewed  as  hierarchical 
formations, meaning that individuals and groups can be ranked according to their endowment 
with  valued  goods,  attributes,  and  privileges  (e.g.,  Treiman,  1977;  Bourdieu,  1986; 
Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Hence, the term ‘status’ describes an individual’s relative standing 
compared to that of other members of society. More precisely, it refers to the functional 
importance of certain social positions (Davis and Moore, 1945). Occupation is commonly 
regarded as the most important indicator of an individual’s standing in society (Treiman, 
1977; Ganzeboom et al., 1992). 
The functional importance of occupations is indicated by factors such as the required level of 
formal  education,  income,  and  the  associated  prestige  (Treiman,  1977;  Bourdieu,  1986; 
Bourdieu  and Wacquant, 1992).  Existence of a stratification scheme—i.e.,  the ranking of 
people—implies  an  unequal  distribution  of  these  ‘goods’  among  members  of  society.  A 
frequently  applied  indicator  of  status  is  the  International  Socio-Economic  Index  of 
Occupational  Status  (ISEI) introduced by Ganzeboom  et  al.  (1992). This  index combines 
information on the average level of required formal education and average income in different 
occupations to create a continuous measure of status, which we standardise so that it ranges 
from 0 to 1. ISEI scores for selected occupations are provided in Table A2 of the Appendix, 
which also illustrates the allocation of occupations to three different social classes. 
The discrimination of different occupations for the construction of the ISEI is based on the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-68) of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO, 1969). ISEI scores are regularly included in prominent German population 
surveys,  such  as  the  Socio-Economic  Panel  (SOEP)  and  the  General  Social  Survey 
(ALLBUS). 
 
3.2 Status, Group Identity, and Social Rivalry 
Sociologists claim that the way people feel, think, and act is rooted in their identity, and that 
identity, in turn, is a status-dependent social construct (e.g., Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Mead, 1967). The importance of the identity concept for economic applications is emphasised 
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010). Basing their argument in social psychological research, 
they operationalise identity as a set of socially  defined  codes of practice: for each social 8 
context, a set of socially constituted prescriptions defines which practices are appropriate for 
whom. These prescriptions are supposed to be internalised by an individual through various 
phases of  socialisation: ‘significant others’—i.e., influential actors and role-models such as 
parents,  peers,  and  communities  with  which  a  person  is  affiliated—contribute  to  the 
construction of identity by inscribing their formal and informal codes of conduct into  the 
individual’s cognition (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Mead, 1967). Internalising means that 
these codes become pre-reflexive, i.e., they function below the threshold of consciousness. As 
these  socially  constituted  codes  are  usually  defined  for  classes  of  people  sharing  certain 
characteristics or attributes, identity is shaped by perceived membership in social groups and 
communities (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000; Stets and Burke, 2000). Or, as Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000: 720) put it: ‘identity is bound to social categories; and individuals identify 
with people in some categories and differentiate themselves from those in others’. Hence, 
personal identity reflects group identity. In status-consciousness societies, status discrepancies 
serve  as  the  foundation  for  categorisation,  as  they  provide  an  effective  tool  for  labelling 
people (e.g., Treiman, 1977; Sørensen, 2000; Goldthorpe, 2002). Depending on their status, 
individuals are assigned to classes (e.g., the upper class or lower class), which inevitably 
affects their life conditions and self-images—i.e., people usually perceive themselves to be of 
a particular rank and thereby identify with a specific social class (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984). 
Therefore, status provides the basis for the construction of class identity. 
Identity  is  a  contrastive  principle  (Hogg  and  Abrams,  1988),  as  identification  with  one 
category and dissociation from another are two sides of the same coin. An important insight 
from social psychology is that the identification with social groups and the internalisation of 
group  identity  leads  to  in-group  favouritism  (Tajfel  and  Turner,  1986;  Brown,  2000).
9 In 
contrast to the typical assumption in microeconomics, individuals are also  concerned about 
the well-being and reputation of the groups or social categories they identify with, since their 
self-esteem is derived from affiliation with  these  social groups  (Brown, 2000;  Stets and 
Burke, 2000). 
Class-identity-related codes of conduct   are commonly  assumed  to be  a  reflection of  the 
collective experiences members of the same social class gather as well as the manifold forms 
of social deprivation and inequality they face .  Generally speaking,  sociological research 
suggests that people of high standing seek distinction from low ranks in order to enhance and 
secure their privileged and prestigious position , whereas people of low standing strive for 
                                                           
9 Experimental studies reveal that this pattern occurs even when people are randomly assigned to groups or 
categories. See Chen and Li (2009) and Akerlof and Kranton (2010) for a survey of experimental studies. 9 
status advancement and a levelling of status-related differences between classes.
10 However, 
the concept of identity suggests that it is not solely personal standing that an individual cares 
about, but  also the standing of the groups  with which  he or she identifies. Social groups 
compete for prestigious and privileged positions in society.  To confirm their standing and 
identity, people create and reproduce symbolic boundaries between classes by  establishing 
class-specific attitudes or engaging in certain rank-typical activities (Elias, 1969; Bourdieu, 
1984). Due to these symbolic boundaries and their manifestations in everyday life, the borders 
between ranks are not very permeable. Although these social structures are beyond the control 
of an ordinary citizen, a person in a high political office may be able to initiate adjustments in 
class differences. 
 
4. Prime Ministers’ Socioeconomic Backgrounds and Public Spending Priorities 
Based on the preceding argument, we expect that prime ministers socialised in a low-status 
environment will seek to even out status-related discrepancies between people of low and 
high ranking. Sociologists draw an important distinction between primary socialisation, i.e., 
‘the first socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 
130), and secondary socialisation, which takes place after adolescence. Accordingly, both 
prime  ministers’  parental  status—as  the  family  is  the  most  important  agent  of  primary 
socialisation (Mead, 1967)—and personal status attained prior to pursuing a political career 
are likely important factors in the process of identity construction.  
The manipulation of the composition of public expenditure is a potentially effective way to 
change  social  stratification,  as  it  allows  influencing  the  allocation  of  resources  between 
groups of people. Although income and education are prime indicators of personal status, 
stratification research documents that the extent of status-related social inequalities is much 
broader. Questions thus arise as to (i) the main dimensions of status-related social inequality 
and (ii) which spending items facilitate levelling these inequalities? 
Status, social security, and education. We expect that governments led by prime ministers 
from poor socioeconomic backgrounds spend (relatively) more on public education and social 
security. The main indicators of status discrepancies, education and income, are inversely 
related to vulnerability to undesirable life events such as financial distress and unemployment 
(McLeod and Kessler, 1990). Hence, low-status people are much more likely to rely on the 
social  safety  net  and  be  beneficiaries  of  public  welfare  services.  Accordingly,  there  is 
                                                           
10 The idea that status discrepancies may influence decision-making by providing incentives has been applied to 
economics  in  several  forms.  However,  in  these  applications  it  is  usually  only  personal  status  with  which 
individuals are supposed to be concerned. See Fershtman et al. (1996) for a summary. 10 
empirical evidence derived from survey data which indicates the existence of a social rivalry 
motive in redistributive politics. Corneo and Grüner (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
demonstrate that individual preferences for redistribution are negatively connected to personal 
income and education. Supporting the importance of the socialising environment, Alesina and 
Giuliano (2009) show that it is not only current personal income and education that matter for 
redistribution preferences, but also family income during childhood and father’s education. 
In  the  field  of  education,  tax-financed  schools  and  universities  compete  with  institutions 
financed primarily by tuition fees and other forms of private contributions. Less spending on 
education  may  worsen  the  quality  of  publicly-funded  educational  institutions  and  thereby 
widen the discrepancies between status  ranks,  as  rich people have much easier  access  to 
private  education.  By  increasing  spending  on  education,  incumbents  may  enhance  the 
educational  participation  of  the  lower  class.
11  German  educational  expansion 
(Bildungsexpansion) during the last four decades is commonly regarded as a good example of 
this (Hradil, 1999; Geißler, 2002). 
Status and public safety. Studies in criminology show that a person’s socioeconomic status is 
inversely related to the prevalence of victimisation and fear of crime (e.g., Will, 1995).
12 
Clemente and Kleiman (1977: 523) attribute this finding to status-related income differences, 
since higher income enables high-status people to provide themselves a safe environment : 
‘people with greater financial resources are better able to protect themselves from harm and, 
therefore, have less fear of being victimized. And, of course, individuals in the higher income 
brackets can afford to live in safe neighborhoods’. Based on the argument that preferences 
and attitudes reflect mutual experiences of class members, we should thus expect that prime 
ministers from poor socioeconomic backgrounds will tend to spend more on public safety and 
legal protection. 
Status and health. In Germany, a publicly-provided health care system competes with private 
health services, which are  generally  accessible only to higher-income households. Due to 
remarkable differences in quality, health care experts call this a ‘two-tier’ medical system: 
high status persons are much better provided for than those of low standing (e.g., Mielck, 
                                                           
11 An occurrence in Hesse in 2010 attracted a great deal of media attention. The former prime minister Roland 
Koch—whose father was a lawyer, as is Koch (ISEI score 0.85)—announced that the Hessian government will 
cut funding to public universities (which currently charge no tuition) by 30 million Euros for each following 
year. Roland Koch justified this decision by referring to the tough budgetary situation. However, only a few 
weeks later, the Hessian government agreed to donate about 25 million Euros to a private university, which 
charges tuition of 12,000 Euros per year. 
12 At first sight, this finding may be surprising.  Note, however, that the studies listed rely on data solely from 
developed countries. Thus, this relationship may be driven b y the experience of countries with strong legal 
institutions in which high-income households do not fear dispossession or violent property offences. 11 
2005; Bauer et al., 2007). To improve the living conditions of the lower class, we expect 
prime ministers who identify with low-status people to spend more on public health care. 
Status and public infrastructure. Insufficient provision of public infrastructure in general and 
public transport systems in particular is frequently seen as the most significant barrier to 
social inclusion, for mobility is a necessary condition for participating in social activities (e.g., 
Church  et  al.,  2000;  Cass  et  al.,  2005;  Gray  et  al.,  2006).  Usually,  people  from  poor 
socioeconomic backgrounds are more dependent on public transportation. Due to the high 
cost of cars, low-income households have to rely on public transportation (e.g., LeRoy and 
Sonstelie,  1983;  Glaeser  et  al.,  2008).  Hence,  low-status  people  would  benefit 
overproportionally from spending on public infrastructure and we hypothesise that low-status 
prime ministers will place relatively more importance on this budget component. 
Status  and  culture.  Following  Bourdieu  (1984,  1986),  cultural  activity  is  an  important 
attribute  of  class  distinction.  Museums,  art  exhibitions,  and  theatres  are  more  frequently 
visited by people from the upper class; these forms of cultural engagement mark an aesthetic 
lifestyle.  According to  Bourdieu  (1984, 1986), access  to  most of these exclusive cultural 
practices  requires  a  high  endowment  with  so-called  cultural  capital,  that  is,  formal  and 
informal education, as well as an aesthetic sense acquired during socialisation. People from 
lower classes are usually prone to  participate in so-called popular cultural activities, e.g., 
watching movies, attending pop concerts, etc. As our data on public expenditure composition 
do not allow differentiating between these two types of cultural programmes, we are not able 
to form expectations about how prime ministers’ socioeconomic background will influence 
their spending on culture. 
Note that we do not expect to find a positive impact of prime ministers’ family status on any 
specific  spending  category,  since  none  of  these  categories  is  likely  to  promote  the 
consolidation and reproduction of boundaries between classes. However, expecting higher 
shares for some budget components implies lower shares for others. 
 
5. Model and Data
13 
To empirically test our hypotheses about the structure of public budgets, we employ panel 
data from 1992−2008 for the German non-city states. We estimate the following panel data 
model for each spending category separately:
14 
                                                           
13 Data sources are described in the Appendix. Descriptive statistics for all variables employed in our empirical 
analyses are provided  in Table A3. 
14 The time constraint is due to a lack of publicly -available data for public expenditure composition prior to 
1992. 12 
                                                                      
                                                                       
αi is a state-specific intercept, μt a time-varying parameter that is constant across states, and 
ηi,t is an i.i.d. error term. yi,t denotes spending on a certain item as a share of total spending (in 
percentage points). Taking into account that the preceding discussion suggests that politicians 
manipulate the composition of public expenditure in order to support certain groups of voters, 
we base our empirical analysis on a functional classification of expenditure items (Vergne, 
2009).  Altogether,  we  consider  eight  different  items:  public  administration,  public  safety, 
education, research and development, culture, social security, heath care, and infrastructure. 
Each specification contains the first lag of the dependent variable in order to account for 
persistency and gradual budget adjustments. 
As economic variables we include the debt-to-GDP ratio so as to control for the budgetary 
situation, the output gap
15 and unemployment rate as regional business cycle indicators, and 
the  share  of  net  transfers  received  through  the  German  fiscal  equali sation  scheme 
(Länderfinanzausgleich) to total expenditure.
16 
The sociodemographic variables contain several proxies for the demand for public services, 
specifically real GDP per head (in 1,000 Euro) in each state, capturing the (average) economic 
condition of the electorate, as well as the share of the population aged less than 25 years and 
the  share  of  the  population  older  than  65,  since  these  two  groups  of  voters  benefit 
overproportionately from the provision of some public services (e.g., education and health). 
Among the political  variables is an election period dummy, which allows testing for the 
existence of Rogoff (1990) type and Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2010) type PBCs. Following 
Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2010) and Vergne (2009), we control for the timing of elections 
such that the election period dummy takes the value 1 in the year before the election takes 
place if the election is held in the first half of the year; if the election is held in the second half 
of  the  year,  the  dummy  takes  the  value  1  in  the  election  year.  Other  political  variables 
considered in our model measure constraints on the prime minister’s power, as these could 
affect his or her influence on spending priorities. We include the share of votes the governing 
party received at the last elections as well as dummies for coalition governments and minority 
governments to control for political dispersion. We also add a dummy indicating whether the 
minister of finance is from the same party as the prime minister, following Jochimsen and 
Nuscheler (2011). This is to account for the fact that ministers of finance have significant 
                                                           
15 The output gap is calculated by regressing the real GDP on a trend variable and a squared trend variable. 
16 The German fiscal equalisation scheme   (Länderfinanzausgleich) harmonises revenues across the German 
Laender, which may affect incentive to engage in sound fiscal policy. See Seitz (2000) for a detailed description. 13 
authority with respect to preparation of the public budget. Finally, we include a dummy for 
SPD-led governments in order to account for partisan ideology effects. 
As  leader  characteristics,  we  employ  German  prime  ministers’  age  and  years  in  office, 
capturing his or her experience, a dummy for prime ministers who govern a state in which 
they did not formerly reside, which could affect their reputation among the electorate, and a 
dummy for prime ministers who have been members in employees’ associations, since this 
sort of membership may indicate emotional proximity to certain groups of voters. Moreover, 
we add a dummy for years in which a new prime minister comes to power, capturing possible 
transition  effects.  Our  main  variables  of  interest  are  prime  ministers’  parental  status  and 
personal status, as defined in Sections 3 and 4. Status scores are measured by the means of the 
ISEI values and standardised to lie between 0 to 1 (see Section 3.1). We expect that prime 
ministers  characterised  by  low  parental  status  and  personal  status,  respectively,  conduct 
policies  which  may  enhance  the  levelling  of  status-related  inequalities.  Thus,  we  should 
observe  that  the  tenures  of  prime  ministers  from  poor  socioeconomic  backgrounds  are 
connected with a higher share of spending on public safety, education, social security, health, 
and infrastructure, whereas prime ministers of high status should decrease spending on these 
items. Table 1 summarises our research hypotheses. 
 
Table 1: Theoretically expected influence of parental status and personal status across the 
main spending categories. 
  Public 
admin. 
Public 
safety  Education  R&D  Culture  Social 
security  Health  Infra-
structure 
Parental 
status  0  –  –  0  0  –  –  – 
Personal 
status  0  –  –  0  0  –  –  – 
 
The question arises what policy priorities a socially mobile prime minister is likely to set, i.e. 
how his or her identification is affected by social advancement or decline, respectively. For 
instance, a prime minister characterised by low parental status and high personal status makes 
one  social  class  worse  off  by  manipulating  the  public  spending  composition  in  a  certain 
direction.  To  take  the  impact  of  social  mobility  on  spending  priorities  into  account,  we 
interact parental status and personal status and include this variable as an additional regressor. 
We  estimate  the  above  equation  using  a  two-way  fixed  effects  approach.  In  our  core 
specification, we rely on the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator. Although the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, which causes the least squares 
estimator to be biased, reflecting the specific structure of our panel, we prefer the LSDV 
estimator to a GMM approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991). As Judson and Owen (1997) show, 14 
the LSDV estimator can be appropriate in ‘long’ panels even in a dynamic framework, since 
the bias that occurs becomes negligible for growing T. On the contrary, GMM estimators 
typically reveal poor small-sample properties when N is small (Kiviet, 1995). Given that in 
our sample the number of periods exceeds the number of cross-sections, we apply GMM as a 
robustness check only. 
 
6. Results 
Table 2 shows the empirical results for each specification of our model. To save space, we 
report only the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The lower part of the table provides 
Wald statistics for tests of joint significance for each group of variables and the variables 
depicting a prime minister’s socioeconomic background in particular. Three findings stand 
out as particularly relevant in light of the theoretical discussion in the first part of the paper. 
First, we find that the composition of public expenditure is not systematically affected by 
government ideology. This result is consistent with previous studies by Galli and Rossi (2002) 
and Schneider (2010). The dummy for SPD-led governments reveals a significant impact only 
in case of spending on public infrastructure. Moreover, this effect is rather small: in the long 
run, SPD prime ministers increase the share of spending on infrastructure by 1 percentage 
point (pp).  
Second, we find no sign of any pre-electoral manipulation of public expenditure composition. 
The dummy variable for pre-election periods has no significant impact on the share of total 
expenditure devoted to any item. Hence, there appears to be no evidence for Rogoff (1990) or 
Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2010) type political budget cycles within the German Laender.
17 
Although we do not find evidence for partisan or budget cycles, the tests of joint significance 
indicate that the political environment generally exerts an impact on public  expenditure 
priorities: weak governments (coalition governments and minority govern ments) spend, on 
average, less on public administration, public safety, and health, but more on social security. 
Finally, we find that statistically, the composition of public expenditure within the German 
Laender is significantly affected by the social class their prime ministers are associated with. 
Focusing on the individual variables measuring parental and personal status, we find that both 
are relevant for a number of budget items. In most specifications, the individual effects are of 
comparable size and statistically equivalent.  
                                                           
17 Note that this conclusion also holds when we exclude time fixed effects or the dummy for prime minister 
transitions from our regressions. 15 
 
Table 2: Determinants of public expenditure composition—Main specification. 
Variables  Public admin.  Public safety  Education  R&D  Culture  Social security  Health  Infrastructure 
Y(-1)  0.486 
 
**  0.362 
 
**  0.353 
 
**  0.328 
 
**  0.413 
 
**  0.606 
 
**  0.447 
 
**  0.388 
 
** 
Economic variables                              
Debt-to-GDP  –0.029   –0.031   –0.222 **  –0.028 **  –0.004   0.010   –0.004   –0.030  
Output gap  0.043 *  0.017   0.043   –0.015   0.004   –0.012   0.016   –0.044  
Unemployment  0.138   0.114 *  0.577 **  0.015   0.010   –0.403 *  0.107   0.118  
Net transfers  –0.004   –0.012   0.006   0.019   –0.001   –0.045   –0.146 **  –0.102  
Political variables                              
SPD  0.029   0.101   0.569   0.005   0.033   0.030   0.256   0.881 * 
Coalition  –0.296   –0.306 *  –0.744 *  0.006   –0.052   0.306   –0.336 *  0.092  
Minority government  –0.828 *  –0.794   –2.422   –0.457   –0.113   2.571 **  0.104   0.263  
Vote share  –0.022   –0.041 **  –0.041   –0.011 **  –0.010 *  –0.019   –0.018   –0.033  
MoF from same party  –0.490 *  –0.416 *  –3.133 *  0.007   –0.271   –0.923 *  –0.835 **  –2.606 ** 
Election period  0.054   0.116   0.068   0.028   0.035   –0.094   0.108   0.007  
Sociodemographic variables                              
Population share < 25 yrs.  –0.426   –0.924 **  –1.363 *  –0.003   –0.000   –1.899 **  –0.065   0.216  
Population share > 65 yrs.  –0.098   –0.330   –0.972   0.010   –0.029   –1.067 *  0.188   0.166  
Real GDP per capita  –0.381 **  –0.431 **  –1.035 **  0.040   –0.006   –0.813 **  –0.326 *  –0.259  
Leader variables                              
PM transition  0.016   0.123   –0.183   0.018   –0.024   –0.217   0.238   –0.087  
Outside PM  0.384 *  0.181   1.165 **  0.134   –0.080   –1.003   0.486 **  –0.037  
Union member  –0.119   –0.537 **  –1.280 **  –0.109 **  –0.078   –0.295   –0.393 **  –0.520  
Age  –0.027 *  –0.014   –0.026   –0.006   0.002   0.042   0.028   –0.065 ** 
Years in office  0.039 **  0.037   0.047   0.014 *  0.004   –0.009   –0.023   0.041  
Parental status  5.017 *  –7.526 **  –14.405 *  –2.050 *  –2.067 *  –7.115   –7.612   –10.251  
Personal status  3.031 *  –7.077 **  –14.968 **  –2.535 **  –1.520   –4.817 *  –7.561 *  –9.108 * 
Parental status*personal status  –6.023 *  9.110 **  18.302 **  2.713 *  2.589 *  8.374   10.546   11.949  
                                 
Joint sign. economic variables  χ
2(4) = 8.4  χ
2(4) = 6.9  χ
2(4) = 21.8**  χ
2(4) = 9.0  χ
2(4) = 1.3  χ
2(4) = 6.4  χ
2(4) = 24.3**  χ
2(4) = 36.5** 
Joint sign. political variables  χ
2(6) = 24.6**  χ
2(6) = 24.4**  χ
2(6) = 18.8**  χ
2(6) = 38.2**  χ
2(6) = 36.3**  χ
2(6) = 82.9**  χ
2(6) = 29.0**  χ
2(6) = 25.1** 
Joint sign. sociodem. variables  χ
2(3) = 14.2**  χ
2(3) = 54.8**  χ
2(3) = 21.3**  χ
2(3) = 3.5  χ
2(3) = 0.4  χ
2(3) = 45.2**  χ
2(3) = 5.6  χ
2(3) = 4.4 
Joint sign. leader variables  χ
2(8) = 187.3**  χ
2(8) = 55.9**  χ
2(8) = 46.7**  χ
2(8) = 64.3**  χ
2(8) = 26.0**  χ
2(8) = 48.1**  χ
2(8) = 68.8**  χ
2(8) = 258.1** 
Joint sign. status variables  χ
2(3) = 17.5**  χ
2(3) = 38.5**  χ
2(3) = 11.7**  χ
2(3) = 27.3**  χ
2(3) = 8.3*  χ
2(3) = 13.0**  χ
2(3) = 9.3*  χ
2(3) = 36.9** 
R
2  0.60   0.77   0.58   0.46   0.36   0.74   0.75   0.39  
Observations  208   208   208   208   208   208   208   208  
Parameters  51   51   51   51   51   51   51   51  
Notes: The dependent variables measure public spending on a certain item as a share of total spending (in percentage points). Results are based on 
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation. All models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel robust standard errors are used. * 
and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 16 
 
However, the size and significance of the interaction term reveals that the influence a prime 
minister’s parental status exerts on spending priorities depends on his or her personal status 
and vice versa. Thus, the estimated individual coefficients are of limited interpretative value, 
as they would only become relevant if the respective other status variable were zero.
18 The 
direction of the interaction effect is always the opposite of the impact of parental status and 
personal status. This finding suggests that a high parental status (personal status) diminishes 
the effect of a change in personal status (parental status). Hence, social mobility matters with 
regard to fiscal priorities. 
To  facilitate  the  interpretation  of  the  coefficients  and  to  gain  further  insights  into  the 
relationship between parental status and personal status, we consider four types of prime 
ministers: an upper-class prime minister, i.e. one  of high parental and personal status (type 
high); a lower-class prime minister, i.e. one of low parental and personal status (type low); an 
upwardly mobile prime minister, i.e. one of low parental status, but high personal status (type 
up); and an downwardly mobile prime minister, i.e. a one of high parental status, but low 
personal status (type down).
19 We then calculate the expected share of public expenditure 
devoted  to  each  single  spending  category  by  each  type  of  prime  minister,  taking  the 
interaction effect between parental and personal status into account , and test whether the 
differences are significantly different from zero.
20 The results are presented in Table 3.  The 
figure in cell (i, j) represents the difference between a prime minister of type i (row name) and 
type j (column name) with regard to the expected share of public expenditure devoted to the 
respective item. 
 
                                                           
18 Note that parental status and personal status have strictly positive values, 
19 We consider an ISEI score of 0.8 as high and an ISEI score of 0.3 as low. These scores are reasonably close to 
the upper and lower bound of our sample range and roughly correspond to the average ISEI scores of academic 
professions and tradesmen, respectively .  Examples for different prime minister  types are presented in the 
Appendix (Table A4). 
20 Technically, we test linear restrictions on the coefficients of parental status, personal status, and the interaction 
term of parental status and personal status. 17 
 
Table 3: Comparing the share of public spending on each item (in relation to total spending) for different prime minister types. 
  Public administration    Public safety    Education    Research and development 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down 
High  —  0.71*  0.10  –0.89    —  –2.29**  –0.12  0.11    —  –4.62**  0.12  –0.16    —  –0.80**  0.06**  –0.18 
Low  –0.71*  —  –0.61  –1.61*    2.29**  —  2.17**  2.40**    4.62**  —  4.74**  4.46*    0.80**  —  0.86**  0.62* 
Up  –0.10  0.61  —  –0.99    0.12  –2.29**  —  0.22    –0.12  –4.74**  —  –0.28    –0.06**  –0.86**  —  –0.24 
Down  0.89  1.61*  0.99  —    –0.11  –2.40**  –0.22  —    0.16  –4.46*  0.28  —    0.18  –0.62*  0.24  — 
 
  Culture    Social security    Health    Infrastructure 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down 
High  —  –0.37  0.00  0.28    —  –1.36**  –0.21  0.94    —  –1.79**  0.41**  0.44    —  –3.11**  –0.35  0.23 
Low  0.37  —  0.37  0.65*    1.36**  —  1.15  2.30    1.79**  —  2.20**  2.22    3.11**  —  2.76**  3.33 
Up  –0.00  –0.37  —  0.27    0.21  –1.15  —  1.15    –0.41**  –2.20**  —  0.03    0.35  –2.76**  —  0.57 
Down  –0.28  –0.65*  –0.27  —    –0.94  –2.30  –1.15  —    –0.44  –2.22  –0.03  —    –0.23  –3.33  –0.57  — 
Notes: The different prime minister types are defined as follows: high: prime minister has a high parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.8); 
low: prime minister has a low parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.3); up: prime minister has a low parental status (ISEI score 0.3), but 
high personal status (ISEI score 0.8); down: prime minister has a high parental status (ISEI score 0.8), but low personal status (ISEI score 0.3). 
Figures are derived as follows: first, the expected share of public spending devoted to each item is calculated for each prime minister type, taking 
the interaction effect between parental status and personal status into account and holding other factors fixed. Second, the difference between a type 
i prime minister (row name) and a type j prime minister (column name) is computed. * and ** indicate that the difference is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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In  line  with  our  conjectures  made  in  Sections  3  and  4,  we  find  that  lower-class  prime 
ministers spend significantly more on public safety, education, research and development, 
social  security,  health,  and  infrastructure.  These  differences  are  not  only  statistically 
significant, but also economically substantial. For example, prime ministers characterised by 
low parental and personal status spend, on average, 4.6 percentage points (pp) more in the 
short run on education than prime ministers of high parental and personal status. In the long 
run, the effects add up to 7.1 pp. In the case of public safety, lower-class prime ministers 
spend  2.3  pp  more  in  the  short  run  and  3.6  pp  in  the  long  run  than  their  upper-class 
counterparts. For spending on public health care services, the difference is 1.8 pp in the short 
run and 3.2 pp in the long run.  Finally, lower-class prime ministers spend 3.1 pp more in the 
short run and 5.1 pp more in the long run on infrastructure. Thus, there is strong evidence that 
prime ministers characterised by a poor socioeconomic background conduct policies which 
promote  a  levelling  of  status-related  social  inequalities.  The  share  of  spending  on  public 
administration is, on the contrary, positively related to a prime minister’s status. Arguably, 
this result is due to the fact that public administration is the largest residual category; if a 
lower-class prime minister spends relatively more on items facilitating an alleviation of social 
deprivation, a lower share for other budget items is implied.
21  
Focussing on socially mobile prime ministers  helps assess whether the direction of social 
mobility matters. In most specifications, we observe significant differences between lower-
class and downwardly mobile prime ministers, i.e. prime ministers of high parental status and 
low personal status.  Despite the fact that personal status is the same,  downwardly mobile 
prime  ministers  spend  significantly  less  on  public  safety,  education,  research  and 
development, and culture than lower -class prime ministers.
22 For most spending items, the 
difference between downwardly mobile and lower-class prime ministers is similar to that of 
upper- and lower-class prime ministers.  Accordingly, we find  hardly any difference when 
comparing  upper-class  and  downwardly mobile prime ministers .  Finally, there are  only 
negligible differences between  upwardly mobile prime ministers, i.e. ones of low parental 
status but high personal status, and upper-class prime ministers. To summarise, we find strong 
evidence  that prime ministers adapt to the upper class in case of a social  advancement, 
                                                           
21 When  running  a  regression  on  the  combined  share  of  public  spending  on  all  budget  items  not  explicitly 
considered in our analysis, we find a significantly positive impact of prime ministers’ parental and personal 
status. However, as far as we are able to determine, there is no specific spending item contained in this broad 
residual  category  that  appears  to  be  solely  responsible  for  this  finding,  which  suggests  that  the  positive 
coefficient comes about by aggregating the various public spending shares.  
22 Note that the differences between lower-class prime ministers and  downwardly mobile prime ministers with 
respect to spending on health and infrastructure are significant at a 10% level.  19 
whereas  downwardly  mobile  prime  ministers  stick  to  their  parent-induced  upper-class 
identity. 
The types of prime minister considered for our comparison represent extremes, since they 
refer  to  the  upper  and  lower  bound  of  the  social  stratification  system.  To  deepen  our 
discussion, we introduce a middle-class prime minister and compare him or her to upper- and 
lower-class  types.
23 Again, we consider  socially-mobile  prime ministers.  The results are 
shown in the Appendix. Table A5 refers to the comparison between lower-class and middle-
class,  Table A6  between  middle-  and  upper-class.  The  differences  between  lower-  and 
middle-class prime ministers are more pronounced than the differences between middle- and 
upper-class types. Taking the share of public spending on education as an example, we find 
that prime ministers of medium parental and personal status spend, on average, 3.5 pp less in 
the short run than prime ministers  of  low parental and personal status.  In contrast, the 
difference between a middle-class and an upper-class prime minister is generally only about 
one third of that (1.2 pp). The same pattern occurs with respect to spending on public safety, 
research and development, and infrastructure: in all these cases, the difference between an 
upper- and a middle-class prime minister is about one-third of the difference between a lower-
class and a middle-class prime minister.  
In case of public spending on social security and health,  the difference between middle- and 
upper-class is negligible and statistically insignificant, i.e. only lower -class prime ministers 
spend more on these items. Thus, the fiscal policy difference between the lower-class and the 
other ranks is relatively large. Stratification theory points out that p eople of low status are 
particularly exposed to the risk of financial distress, marginalisation, and social exclusion, so 
that they typically depend strongly on public welfare services (e.g., Breen, 1997). Moreover, 
two conclusions derived above, namely that (i) upwardly mobile prime ministers tend to adapt 
and (ii) personal status hardly matters for those who are downwardly mobile, do not hold for 
those moving  between the middle and lower class.  In particular,  upwardly mobile prime 
ministers spend significantly more on public safety, education, research and developme nt, 
culture, and infrastructure than middle-class prime ministers, whereas downwardly mobile 
prime ministers spend significantly less on these budget components. 
Several other leader characteristics are also significant. Prime ministers who are members of 
employees’  associations  spend significantly less on public safety, education,  research and 
development, and health. Only in the case of spending on education do we find economically 
                                                           
23 For the middle-class, we choose an ISEI score of 0.55, which corresponds approximately to the average ISEI 
score for white-collar workers and technical workers. Moreover, it is equidistant to the ISEI scores representing 
the upper- and the lower-classes. 20 
relevant results: prime ministers who are union members spend on average about 1.1 pp less 
on education; the long run effect is 1.75 pp. Given the fact that nowadays unions usually 
represent the middle class—i.e., well-trained employees with secure jobs—and provide own 
educational  opportunities,  such  as  training  courses  and  scholarships,  this  result  seems 
plausible. Tenures of prime ministers who come from outside the state they govern (dummy 
outside PM) are associated with higher spending on education, R&D, and health, which can 
be labelled as visible and targetable items. Arguably, outside prime ministers need to conduct 
‘popular’ policies in order to improve their reputation. 
 
7. Checks for Robustness 
To discover whether our results are robust and gain further insight, we modify our initial 
specifications  in  several  ways.  First,  we  re-estimate  the  above  equation  using  the  GMM 
approach put forward by Arellano and Bond (1991) in order to account for the correlation 
between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term (see Appendix, Table A7). We 
apply one-step GMM estimation using up to five valid lags of the dependent variable as 
instruments  for  the  lagged  endogenous  variable.
24  Consistent  with  the  findings  from 
simulation studies (Kievit, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1997), in most cases the autoregressive 
coefficient becomes a little larger, whereas the coefficients of the other explanatory variables 
slightly decrease.  As our main variables of interest remain significant and  the differences 
between the various types of prime ministers are basically the same, our conclusions  do not 
change. 
Second, we tested whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control  
variables. We controlled for population density, population growth, and the partisan ideology 
of the federal gove rnment. However, the  size and significance  of our  variables of  main 
interest remain unaffected.
25 
Third, a potential problem with our analysis could be that upper-class and upwardly mobile 
prime ministers may generally prefer a lower level of overall public spending. However, in 
practice, not all budget components are equally easy adjustable. Thus, it could be that the 
desired budget cuts affect some components but not others due to reasons of adjustability and 
not policy preference. We address this issue in two different ways. First, we include the public 
expenditure quota, i.e. the ratio of public expenditures to GDP, as an additional control 
                                                           
24 Simulation studies show that the number of lags in dynamic GMM models is subject to a tradeoff: a higher 
number of lags increases both estimation efficiency and the finite sample bias (Judson and Owen, 1997). Hence, 
we restrict the number of instruments to five. Note that with respect to our main variables of interest, we find no 
significant changes when varying the number of lags over a range of 1 to 10 lags. 
25 All additional results are available on request. 21 
variable in our specifications to keep the total amount of public spending fixed. We find that a 
lower  public  expenditure  quota  is  associated  with  relatively  more  spending  on  public 
administration, public safety, education, culture, and health, suggesting that expenditures on 
these items are more difficult to adjust. However, the estimates for our main variables of 
interest remain almost unaffected and all of our conclusions drawn in the previous section 
concerning the comparison of different prime minister types hold up.
26 Thus, our findings are 
not driven by an asymmetric adjustment of total expenditure. 
Another way to address  the aforementioned concern is  using shares of public spending on 
different budget items in relation to GDP as dependent variables instead of computing shares 
to total expenditure. Note, however, that by doing so,  our focus shifts from the analysis of 
public expenditure composition to total public spending on different budget categories.  The 
estimation results for this modification can be found in the Appendix, Table A8.
27 Yet again, 
we consider different  types of prime ministers and compare them to each other  in order to 
facilitate interpretation (Table A9). As the tests of joint significance indicate, the social class a 
prime minister is affiliated with reveals a significant explanatory power in  6  out of  8 
specifications.  Only  in  the  case of  spending on culture and social security  are  the status 
variables  jointly  insignificant .  Thus,  not  only  the  composition  of  public  expenditure  is 
significantly  influenced  by  prime  ministers’  socioeconomic  backgrounds,  but  also  overall 
spending  on  most  items.  Table  A9  reveals  that  upper-class  and  upwardly  mobile  prime 
ministers spend significantly more on public safety, education, research and development, 
health, and infrastructure than their lower-class counterparts. Moreover, we do not find any 
significant difference between upper-class and downwardly mobile prime ministers. These 
findings  are  consistent  with  those  discussed  in  Section  6  and  further  support  our 
conclusions.
28  
Interestingly, we find that upper-class and upwardly mobile prime ministers also increase total 
spending on public administration. Arguably, spending on public administration is used by 
these prime minister types as a strategic instrument. Given that (i) public administration is the 
largest budget category that does not directly affect the economic situation of the lower class 
and that (ii) spending on public administration is negatively related to the l evel of overall 
public spending, indicating that it is difficult to adjust, incumbents  may successfully tie the 
                                                           
26 All additional results are available on request. 
27 Note that we lagged the debt-to-GDP ratio, output gap, unemployment rate, and real GDP per capita by one 
period in order to avoid problems of endogeneity, which may occur when using GDP in the construction of the 
dependent variable (Jochimsen and Nuscheler, 2011). 
28 The differences between upper-class and lower-class prime ministers with respect to spending on education 
and health are significant at a 10% level. 22 




This paper aims at explaining the determinants of the composition of public expenditure. We 
focus  on  the  German  Laender,  for  they  are  characterised  by  homogenous  institutional 
frameworks and political landscapes and, at the same time, are endowed with far-reaching 
fiscal competences. Special attention is paid to the influence of incumbent prime minister 
characteristics, particularly socioeconomic status, as peoples’ attitudes and preferences exhibit 
aspects  of  in-group  favouritism  and  social  rivalry.  Sociological  research  regards  status—
which is strongly determined by education and income—as the main tool of stratification and 
the basis for identity construction. Empirically testing the influence social status, we examine 
whether German prime ministers manipulate public spending priorities in a way to support the 
status groups from which they come. 
In support of our theoretical framework, we find that German state governments led by prime 
ministers from poor socioeconomic backgrounds conduct policies aimed at evening out status-
related differences between people. Particularly, tenures of prime ministers of low parental 
and personal status are connected with more public spending on education, social security, 
public  safety,  infrastructure,  and  health  care,  which  are  the  main  dimensions  of  social 
deprivation. Differentiating fiscal policy priorities across different types of prime ministers, 
we find a notable discrepancy between, on the one side, those belonging to the lower-class, 
and, on the other, those belonging to the middle- and upper-class.  
We also consider the influence of social mobility on fiscal priorities, i.e. situations, where the 
personal social status of prime ministers before they entered office differs from the social 
status of their parents. Our analysis provides strong evidence that prime ministers adapt to the 
upper-class in case of a social advancement. Thus, in the case of upward mobility, we find 
that  parental  status  becomes  rather  irrelevant  in  the  determination  of  the  fiscal  budget 
composition. Quite the reverse is found for downwardly mobile prime ministers who tend to 
stick to their parent-induced, upper-class identity. 
In  contrast  to  previous  studies  focussing  on  various  aspects  of  political  business  cycle 
theories, all of these results are not only highly significant and economically meaningful but 
also robust with regard to the estimation technique and the inclusion of various additional 
control variables.   23 
A word of caution is necessary with respect to the interpretation of one of our findings. Two 
types of prime ministers considered in our analysis do not actually occur in our sample. More 
precisely, there is no case of a prime minister of both low parental and personal status and no 
one who moved to the lower-class. However, this does not imply that these examples are 
unrealistic, as we can observe such cases prior to our sample period. Hence, inasmuch as there 
will be prime ministers with these status characteristics in the future, we believe that our 
results allow extrapolating their fiscal behaviour. 
Finally, in recent years, economists have begun placing more emphasis on the effects leaders 
have on economic outcomes. Typically, leader variables considered in empirical studies do 
not  derive  from  well-developed  theoretical  frameworks  and,  perhaps  not  surprisingly,  the 
resulting empirical evidence is mixed. However, as we show in this paper, which was based 
on a well-defined theoretical framework, future research would do well to pay more attention 
to leader characteristics and their influence on economic performance. In this respect, the 
application of sociological and psychological research can provide valuable insights into the 




Data on public expenditure composition, real GDP, and unemployment rate are taken from the 
Federal  Statistical  Office  (Statistisches  Bundesamt).  Data  on  public  debt  and  transfers 
between the Laender deriving from the fiscal equalisation system are provided by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
Political Variables 
Data  on  election  dates,  vote  shares,  and  government  composition  are  taken  from  the 
homepages of the German Laender and the State Returning Officers (Landeswahlleiter), as is 
historical information on the party affiliation of the ministers of finance. 
 
Sociodemographic Variables 
Data on the share of population aged less than 25 years and older than 65 years, respectively, 




All variables regarding the incumbent prime ministers are from the data set introduced by 
Hayo and Neumeier (2011). 
The  variable  parental  status  measures  the  occupational  status  score  of  prime  ministers’ 
parents using the ISEI scores. In cases where both parents were working or when a parent 
held more than one occupation, the highest ISEI score is employed. If a prime minister was 
entirely raised by one parent only, only the status score of that parent is taken into account. 
The variable personal status equals to the ISEI score of the occupation a prime minister held 
prior to embarking on a political career (defined as first membership in a party executive 
committee or ministry). In cases where prime ministers previously engaged in more than one 
occupation, the occupation with the highest ISEI score was chosen. 
   25 
Breakdown of Public Expenditure, Descriptive Statistics, and Robustness Checks 
Table A1: Detailed breakdown for each expenditure category. 
Spending item  Main components 
Public administration  Political leadership, internal administration, financial management 
Public safety  Police, legal protection, courts, public prosecutors, prisons 
Education  Public schools and universities, vocational schools, scholarships 
R&D  Grants to public research and development institutes 
Culture  Theatres, operas, concerts, zoos, museums 
Social security  Labour market support, social housing, youth and family welfare 
Health  Hospitals, health centres, public health authorities, sports  




Table A2: ISEI scores for selected occupations. 
Occupation  ISEI score 
Upper-class occupations   
Architects, town planners   0.77 
Lawyers  0.85 
Judges  0.90 
University and higher education teachers  0.78 
Middle-class occupations   
Bank teller  0.47 
Bookkeeper  0.56 
Middle rank civil servant  0.59 
Real estate agent, insurance agent  0.61 
Lower-class occupations   
Cabinetmakers  0.36 
Bricklayers  0.32 
Carpenters  0.31 
Farmers  0.26 
Unskilled construction and factory workers  0.24 
Note: Original ISEI scores are divided by 100. The categorisation of occupations with regard 
to the three social classes is done by the authors. 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics. 
Spending item  Obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Public administration  221  6.77  1.64  4.31  12.10 
Public safety  221  10.27  1.39  6.96  14.79 
Education  221  27.72  4.09  19.36  44.19 
R&D  221  1.40  0.69  0.53  4.29 
Culture  221  1.83  0.85  0.38  4.66 
Social security  221  11.28  5.11  2.03  25.41 
Health  221  3.44  2.26  1.12  18.35 
Infrastructure  221  8.53  4.86  2.29  21.58 
Debt-to-GDP  221  19.78  8.94  4.27  40.52 
Output gap  221  0.41  4.09  –9.64  15.81 
Unemployment  221  12.43  4.80  4.40  22.10 
Net transfers  221  1.01  5.19  –14.89  7.81 
SPD  221  0.46  0.50  0  1 
Coalition  221  0.60  0.49  0  1 
Minority government  221  0.04  0.19  0  1 
Vote share  221  44.40  6.63  30.20  60.70 
MoF from same party  221  0.95  0.21  0  1 
Election period  221  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Popul. share < 25 yrs.  221  27.63  2.08  22.06  34.42 
Popul. share > 65 yrs.  221  17.67  2.61  11.29  24.65 
Real GDP per capita  221  22.10  5.11  10.56  31.71 
PM transition  221  0.12  0.32  0  1 
Outside PM  221  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Union member  221  0.12  0.33  0  1 
Age  221  56.18  7.05  41  73 
Years in office  221  6.32  4.55  1  22 
Parental status  221  0.56  0.22  0.23  0.88 
Personal status  221  0.75  0.09  0.53  0.90 
Notes: The first eight rows contain public spending on each specific item as shares of total 
public spending. Net transfers are also computed as a share of total public spending. Real 
GDP per capita is measured in 1000 Euros. 
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Table A4: Examples for different types of prime ministers. 
Type/prime minister (state)  Parental status  Personal status 
Upper-class prime ministers     
Roland Koch (Hesse)  0.85  0.85 
Heide Simonis (Schleswig-Holstein)  0.80  0.80 
Middle-class prime ministers     
Sigmar Gabriel (Lower Saxony)  0.58  0.65 
Jürgen Rüttgers (North Rhine Westphalia)  0.48  0.60 
Upwardly mobile prime ministers     
Kurt Beck (Rhineland-Palatinate)  0.32  0.60 
Wolfgang Böhmer (Saxony-Anhalt)  0.26  0.88 
Downwardly mobile prime ministers     
Wolfgang Clement (North Rhine Westphalia)  0.77  0.66 





Table A5: Comparing the share of public spending on each item (in relation to total spending) for different prime minister types—middle vs. lower 
class. 
  Public administration    Public safety    Education    Research and development 
Type j 
Type i 
Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down 
Medium  —  0.73*  0.43  –0.07    —  –1.71** –0.63** –0.52**    —  –3.45**  –1.08*  –1.23*    —  –0.57**  –0.14*  –0.26** 
Low  –0.73*  —  –0.31  –0.80*    1.71**  —  1.09**  1.20**    3.45**  —  2.37**  2.23*    0.57**  —  0.43**  0.31* 
Up  –0.43  0.31  —  –0.50    0.63**  –1.09**  —  0.11    1.08*  –2.37**  —  –0.14    0.14*  –0.43**  —  –0.12 
Down  0.07  0.80*  0.50  —    0.52**  –1.20** –0.11  —    1.23*  –2.23*  0.14  —    0.26*  –0.31*  0.12  — 
 
  Culture    Social security    Health    Infrastructure 
Type j 
Type i 
Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down    Medium  Low  Up  Down 
Medium  —  –0.35*  –0.16*  –0.02    —  –1.20**  –0.63  –0.05    —  –1.55*  –0.45  –0.44    —  –2.30**  –0.92*  –0.63* 
Low  0.35*  —  0.19  0.32*    1.20**  —  0.58  1.15    1.55*  —  1.10**  1.11    2.30**  —  1.38**  1.67 
Up  0.16*  –0.19  —  0.14    0.63  –0.58  —  0.57    0.45  –1.10**  —  0.01    0.92*  –1.38**  —  0.29 
Down  0.02  –0.32*  –0.14  —    0.05  –1.15  –0.57  —    0.44  –1.11  –0.01  —    0.63*  –1.67  –0.29  — 
Notes: The different prime minister types are defined as follows: medium: prime minister has a medium parental status and personal status (ISEI 
score 0.55); low: prime minister has a low parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.3); up: prime minister has a low parental status (ISEI 
score 0.3), but medium personal status (ISEI score 0.55); down: prime minister has a medium parental status (ISEI score 0.55), but low personal 
status (ISEI score 0.3). Figures are derived as follows: first, the expected share of public spending devoted to each item is calculated for each prime 
minister type, taking the interaction effect between parental status and personal status into account and holding other factors fixed. Second, the 
difference between a type i prime minister (row name) and a type j prime minister (column name) is computed. * and ** indicate that the difference 
is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A6: Comparing the share of public spending on each item (in relation to total spending) for different prime minister types—upper vs. middle 
class. 
  Public administration    Public safety    Education    Research and development 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down 
High  —  –0.02  0.05  –0.45    —  –0.58**  –0.06  0.05    —  –1.17*  0.06  –0.08    —  –0.23**  0.03**  –0.09 
Medium  0.02  —  0.07  –0.43*    0.58**  —  0.52**  0.63**    1.17*  —  1.23*  1.08*    0.23**  —  0.26**  0.14* 
Up  –0.05  –0.07  —  –0.50    0.06  –0.52**  —  0.11    –0.06  –1.23*  —  –0.14    –0.03**  –0.26**  —  –0.12 
Down  0.45  0.43*  0.50  —    –0.05  –0.63**  –0.11  —    0.08  –1.08*  0.14  —    0.09  –0.14*  0.12  — 
 
  Culture    Social security    Health    Infrastructure 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down    High  Medium  Up  Down 
High  —  –0.02  0.00  0.14    —  –0.16  –0.10  0.47    —  –0.23  0.21**  0.22    —  –0.81**  –0.17  0.11 
Medium  0.02  —  0.02  0.16*    0.16  —  0.05  0.63    0.23  —  0.44  0.45    0.81**  —  0.63*  0.92* 
Up  –0.00  –0.02  —  0.14    0.10  –0.05  —  0.57    –0.21**  –0.44  —  0.01    0.17  –0.63*  —  0.29 
Down  –0.14  –0.16*  –0.14  —    –0.47  –0.63  –0.57  —    –0.22  –0.45  –0.01  —    –0.11  –0.92*  –0.29  — 
Notes: The different prime minister types are defined as follows: high: prime minister has a high parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.8); 
medium: prime minister has a medium parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.55); up: prime minister has a medium parental status (ISEI 
score 0.55), but high personal status (ISEI score 0.8); down: prime minister has a high parental status (ISEI score 0.8), but medium personal status 
(ISEI score 0.55). Figures are derived as follows: first, the expected share of public spending devoted to each item is calculated for each prime 
minister type, taking the interaction effect between parental status and personal status into account and holding other factors fixed. Second, the 
difference between a type i prime minister (row name) and a type j prime minister (column name) is computed. * and ** indicate that the difference 
is significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A7: Determinants of public expenditure composition—GMM estimation. 
Variables  Public admin.  Public safety  Education  R&D  Culture  Social security  Health  Infrastructure 
Y(-1)  0.517 
 
**  0.495 
 
**  0.429 
 
**  0.344 
 
**  0.463 
 
**  0.558 
 
**  0.459 
 
**  0.402 
 
** 
Economic variables                                 
Debt-to-GDP  –0.024   –0.018   –0.189   –0.027 **  –0.001   0.016   –0.004   –0.030  
Output gap  0.040   0.010   0.036   –0.014   0.004   –0.007   0.015   –0.043  
Unemployment  0.130   0.106 *  0.538 **  0.015   0.006   –0.452 **  0.109   0.122  
Net transfers  –0.002   –0.014   0.016   0.019   –0.002   –0.062   –0.142 **  –0.100  
Political variables                                 
SPD  0.021   0.088   0.523   0.004   0.023   –0.020   0.264   0.871 * 
Coalition  –0.286   –0.254   –0.674 *  0.004   –0.045   0.250   –0.325 *  0.099  
Minority government  –0.822 *  –0.721   –2.075   –0.453   –0.082   2.514 **  0.134   0.250  
Vote share  –0.021   –0.037 **  –0.038   –0.011 **  –0.009 *  –0.025   –0.017   –0.032  
MoF from same party  –0.469   –0.576 *  –2.930 *  0.004   –0.252   –0.843   –0.860 **  –2.593 ** 
Election period  0.058   0.129   0.058   0.028   0.037   –0.092   0.107   0.012  
Sociodemographic variables                                 
Population share < 25 yrs.  –0.418   –0.775 **  –1.323 *  –0.002   –0.014   –2.009 **  –0.058   0.213  
Population share > 65 yrs.  –0.111   –0.301   –1.004   0.010   –0.041   –1.160 *  0.194   0.168  
Real GDP per capita  –0.362 **  –0.351 **  –0.942 **  0.039   –0.007   –0.897 **  –0.319   –0.249  
Leader variables                                 
PM transition  0.015   0.077   –0.233   0.016   –0.024   –0.190   0.233   –0.087  
Outside PM  0.384 *  0.199   0.949   0.128   –0.065   –1.108 *  0.462 *  –0.005  
Union member  –0.116   –0.513 **  –1.227 **  –0.108 **  –0.069   –0.311   –0.385 **  –0.520  
Age  –0.028 *  –0.016   –0.025   –0.006   0.002   0.046   0.027 *  –0.065 ** 
Years in office  0.039 **  0.039 *  0.047   0.013 *  0.003   –0.010   –0.022   0.042  
Parental status  4.922 *  –7.135 **  –13.219 *  –2.015 *  –1.916 *  –7.111   –7.519   –10.153  
Personal status   2.953 *  –6.679 **  –13.419 **  –2.498 **  –1.415   –5.068 *  –7.421 *  –9.085 * 
Parental status*personal status  –5.914   8.681 **  16.706 *  2.672 *  2.380 *  8.411   10.414   11.838  
                                 
Joint sign. economic variables  χ
2(4) = 4.9  χ
2(4) = 11.5*  χ
2(4) = 21.8**  χ
2(4) = 9.3  χ
2(4) = 1.5  χ
2(4) = 8.7  χ
2(4) = 25.3**  χ
2(4) = 33.6** 
Joint sign. political variables  χ
2(6) = 25.6**  χ
2(6) = 35.1**  χ
2(6) = 15.7*  χ
2(6) = 38.5**  χ
2(6) = 35.9**  χ
2(6) = 114.7**  χ
2(6) = 34.7**  χ
2(6) = 24.6** 
Joint sign. sociodem. variables  χ
2(3) = 11.4**  χ
2(3) = 22.2**  χ
2(3) = 17.6**  χ
2(3) = 3.6  χ
2(3) = 0.4  χ
2(3) = 39.5**  χ
2(3) = 5.0  χ
2(3) = 3.9 
Joint sign. leader variables  χ
2(8) = 256.3**  χ
2(8) = 55.7**  χ
2(8) = 20.1*  χ
2(8) = 65.7**  χ
2(8) = 27.3**  χ
2(8) = 77.1**  χ
2(8) = 39.1**  χ
2(8) = 232.5** 
Joint sign. status variables  χ
2(3) = 16.4**  χ
2(3) = 40.7**  χ
2(3) = 9.3*  χ
2(3) = 26.7**  χ
2(3) = 8.9*  χ
2(3) = 13.0**  χ
2(3) = 8.7*  χ
2(3) = 36.8** 
R
2  0.55   0.77   0.58   0.47   0.36   0.74   0.75   0.39  
Observations  208   208   208   208   208   208   208   208  
Parameters  51   51   51   51   51   51   51   51  
Notes: The dependent variables measure public spending on a certain item as a share of total spending (in percentage points).  Results are based on 
GMM estimation. Lags 2–6 of the dependent variable are used as instruments. All models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel robust 
standard errors are used. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.   31 
Table A8: Determinants of public spending on different budget items. 
Variables  Public admin.  Public safety  Education  R&D  Culture  Social security  Health  Infrastructure 
Y(-1)  0.525 
 
**  0.411 
 
**  0.545 
 
**  0.430 
 
**  0.419 
 
**  0.539 
 
**  0.458 
 
**  0.308 
 
** 
Economic variables                              
Debt-to-GDP (-1)  –0.004   0.002   –0.019 *  –0.003 **  0.000   –0.008   –0.007 *  –0.008  
Output gap (-1)  0.006 *  0.000   0.004   –0.001 *  0.002 *  0.004   0.001   –0.008  
Unemployment (-1)  0.020 *  0.008 *  0.057 **  0.000   0.003   –0.028   0.015   0.006  
Net transfers  0.003   0.001   0.099   0.036 *  –0.010   0.043   –0.046   0.037  
Political variables                              
SPD  –0.011   0.018   0.030   –0.004   0.004   0.042   0.069   0.167 ** 
Coalition  –0.030   –0.025 **  –0.043   –0.005   –0.006   0.062   –0.010   0.052 * 
Minority government  –0.074   –0.023   0.017   –0.057   –0.011   0.409 *  0.118   0.250  
Vote share  –0.002   –0.004 **  –0.002   –0.001   –0.001 *  –0.001   0.002   –0.001  
MoF from same party  –0.040 *  –0.026 *  –0.268 *  0.004   –0.023   –0.086   –0.169 **  –0.424 ** 
Election period  0.006   0.017 **  0.009   0.004   0.004   –0.025   0.003   –0.014  
Sociodemographic variables                              
Population share < 25 yrs.  0.008   0.010   0.063   0.013   0.023 **  –0.157 **  0.013   0.159 ** 
Population share > 65 yrs.  0.013   0.009   –0.011   0.007   0.002   –0.105   0.042   0.047  
Real GDP per capita (-1)  –0.025 *  –0.005   –0.037   0.004   0.001   –0.097 **  –0.044 *  –0.008  
Leader variables                              
PM transition  0.000   0.018 **  –0.027   0.002   –0.001   –0.040   0.022   –0.017  
Outside PM  0.050 *  0.006   0.057   0.008   –0.015   –0.234 *  0.022   –0.079  
Union member  0.003   –0.021   –0.037   –0.011 *  –0.004   0.011   –0.055 *  –0.043  
Age  –0.002   0.000   0.003   0.000   0.001 *  0.007   0.004   –0.005  
Years in office  0.039 *  0.002   –0.001   0.001 *  0.000   –0.005   –0.004   0.002  
Parental status  0.823 **  –0.948 **  –0.748   –0.248 *  –0.203   –0.421   –1.247   –1.977 * 
Personal status  0.470 **  –0.831 **  –0.905 *  –0.304 **  –0.131   –0.035   –1.062 *  –1.491 ** 
Parental status*personal status  –0.953 **  1.223 **  1.137   0.357 *  0.274   0.529   1.729   2.456 * 
                                 
Joint sign. economic variables  χ
2(4) = 18.0**  χ
2(4) = 12.4*  χ
2(4) = 15.4**  χ
2(4) = 8.4  χ
2(4) = 6.7  χ
2(4) = 8.6  χ
2(4) = 6.1  χ
2(4) = 28.3** 
Joint sign. political variables  χ
2(6) = 26.2**  χ
2(6) = 36.3**  χ
2(6) = 40.4**  χ
2(6) = 36.1**  χ
2(6) = 40.9**  χ
2(6) = 26.0**  χ
2(6) = 27.8**  χ
2(6) = 29.9** 
Joint sign. sociodem. variables  χ
2(3) = 11.2*  χ
2(3) = 2.6  χ
2(3) = 21.9**  χ
2(3) = 8.7*  χ
2(3) = 23.9**  χ
2(3) = 15.0**  χ
2(3) = 9.3*  χ
2(3) = 33.5** 
Joint sign. leader variables  χ
2(8) = 159.7**  χ
2(8) = 123.6**  χ
2(8) = 10.3  χ
2(8) = 38.4**  χ
2(8) = 11.1  χ
2(8) = 7.1  χ
2(8) = 40.2**  χ
2(8) = 75.7** 
Joint sign. status variables  χ
2(3) = 67.2**  χ
2(3) = 11.1*  χ
2(3) = 8.7*  χ
2(3) = 21.5**  χ
2(3) = 4.3  χ
2(3) = 0.9  χ
2(3) = 7.7*  χ
2(3) = 18.0** 
R
2  0.61   0.57   0.87   0.58   0.70   0.75   0.84   0.63  
Observations  208   208   208   208   208   208   208   208  
Parameters  51   51   51   51   51   51   51   51  
Notes: The dependent variables measure public spending on a certain item as a share of  GDP (in percentage points). Results are based on least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation. All models include cross-section and time fixed effects. Panel robust standard errors are used. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 32 
Table A9: Comparing the share of public spending on each item (in relation to GDP) for different prime minister types. 
  Public administration    Public safety    Education    Research and development 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down 
High  —  0.12**  0.03*  –0.15*    —  –0.22**  0.02  0.07    —  –0.20  0.08**  0.00    —  –0.08**  0.02**  –0.01 
Low  –0.12**  —  –0.09  –0.27**    0.22**  —  0.23**  0.29**    0.20  —  0.28*  0.20    0.08**  —  0.10**  0.07 
Up  –0.03*  0.09  —  –0.18*    –0.02  –0.23**  —  0.06    –0.08**  –0.28*  —  –0.08    –0.02**  –0.10**  —  –0.03 
Down  0.15**  0.27**  0.18*  —    –0.07  –0.29**  –0.06  —    –0.00  –0.20  0.08  —    0.01  –0.07  0.03  — 
 
  Culture    Social security    Health    Infrastructure 
Type j 
Type i 
High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down    High  Low  Up  Down 
High  —  –0.02  0.01  0.04    —  0.06  0.00  0.19    —  –0.20  0.07**  0.16    —  –0.38**  –0.01  0.24 
Low  0.02  —  0.03  0.06    –0.06  —  –0.06  0.13    0.20  —  0.27*  0.36    0.38**  —  0.38**  0.62* 
Up  –0.01  –0.03  —  0.04    –0.00  0.06  —  0.19    –0.07**  –0.27*  —  0.09    0.01  –0.38**  —  0.24 
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Notes: The different prime minister types are defined as follows: high: prime minister has a high parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.8); 
low: prime minister has a low parental status and personal status (ISEI score 0.3); up: prime minister has a low parental status (ISEI score 0.3), but 
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